Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

L. Rebon, T. Ferreira da Silva, M. Figueroa, carlos saavedra, M. Curty, G. Lima, G. B. Xavier and W.A.T. Nogueira
PHYSICAL REVIEW A 92, 2 (2015)


Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge
theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-
independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might
exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which
arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement:
the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the
outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its
robustness against some eavesdropping strategies.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.92.022337